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Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got 
to Do With It? 
Recognizing Health Insurance as a 
Separate Species of Insurance 
 
Wendy K. Mariner†  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Health reform debates in the United States are typically conducted using 
the language of insurance.1  President Barack Obama described his hopes for 
expanding access to care as “health insurance reform.”2  Both proponents and 
opponents of reform debated the merits of reform proposals leading to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 in insurance terms.3  Yet, 
disagreements over the structure of reform reveal deep differences in what 
proponents and opponents of reform mean by insurance and the role it should 
                                                 
† JD, LLM, MPH, Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of 
Public Health, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical 
Sciences and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine.  My thanks to 
George Annas, Deborah Stone and Jeffrey Stempel for helpful comments on an earlier version 
of this paper, and to Katherine Proctor, JD 2009, BUSL, for research assistance.  Errors and 
omissions remain my own. 
1 See, e.g., TOM DASCHLE ET AL., CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE 
CRISIS 4 (2008); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health 
Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 199 (2008). 
2 See, e.g., Transcript, Obama’s Fifth News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, available 
at www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/us/politics/22obama.transcript.html; Remarks by the 
President in the State of the Union Address, Jan. 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.  
3 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, Mar. 23, 2010, as 
amended by the Health Care and Education Affordability Act, Pub. L. 111-152, Mar. 30, 2010 
[hereinafter “the 2010 Act”].  See, e.g., REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO KILLED HEALTH CARE? 15 
(2007) (criticizing insurance benefits); LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF, THE HEALTHCARE FIX – 
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 15 (2007) (arguing for a single health insurance 
system for the entire country).   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237654
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play in mediating access to health care.  Scholars of insurance law are likely to 
describe insurance somewhat narrowly as a risk spreading device.4  Industry 
representatives, among others, often view conventional indemnity insurance 
as the norm.5  From this perspective, reforms that move too far beyond 
underwriting risks can be seen as undermining actuarial fairness, threatening 
the very idea of insurance and possibly the industry itself. 6  In contrast, most 
reform proponents discuss insurance as though it were simply a mechanism 
for financing health care: Health insurance ought to be universally available 
(on affordable terms, if not free), because health care ought to be universally 
available,7 perhaps a human right.8  From this perspective, most underwriting 
techniques are incompatible with the goals of reform.9  
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and 
Public Policy (1986) (finding one of the primary values of insurance law is the proper 
distribution of risk); Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance: An 
Introduction to Insurance Law 5-6 (1997) (describing health insurance as a risk spreading 
device).  Insurance law casebooks typically describe insurance in these terms and, until 
recently, included only brief sections on health insurance.  See, e.g., Emeric Fischer et al., 
Principles of Insurance Law (3d ed. 2006) (devoting 19 pages—of 1080 pages—to 
discussion of health insurance); Kenneth Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation: 
Cases and Materials (4th ed. 2005) (devoting 53 pages—of 774 pages—to discussion of 
health insurance). 
5 See Inside the Minds: The Insurance Business: Industry Leaders on Managing 
Risks, Ensuring Investments, & Protecting Assets 8 (Marissa Berenson ed., 2004); Press 
Release, America’s Health Ins. Plans, AHIP Statement on House Passage of HR 3962 (Nov. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.ahip.org/content/pressrelease.aspx?docid=28730; Staff of 
H.R. Committee on Ways & Means Republicans, The Commonsense Healthcare 
Reform and Affordability Act: Making Health Insurance More Affordable for 
Families, Affordable for Small Businesses & Affordable for America 2 (Comm. Print 
2009) (prohibiting “arbitrary caps” and “unjust” rescission).  
6 Bruce G. Bodaken, Where Does the Insurance Industry Stand on Health Reform Today?, 
27 Health Aff. 667, 670-71 (2008) (noting that guaranteed issue and not basing rates on 
health status threaten “basic and long-standing principles of the health insurance business,” 
although some insurers favored reforms like individual mandates that expand the market).  See 
also Interview by Bill Moyers with Wendell Potter, Bill Moyers Journal: Profits or Patients 
(PBS television broadcast July 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07102009/watch2.html.  For an historical perspective, 
see The Politics of Health Care Reform: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the 
Future (James A. Morone & Gary S. Belkin eds., 1994) (providing a compilation of articles 
discussing insurance reform).   
7 See, e.g., Daschle, supra note 1, at xiii (arguing for a universal health care system); 
Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance,  Institute of Medicine, Insuring 
America’s Health: Principles and Recommendations 110-11 (2004) (describing a vision 
to expand coverage to those without health insurance); The Physicians’ Working Group for 
Single-Payer National Health Insurance, Special Communication, Proposal of the Physicians’ 
Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798, 798-805 (2003). 
8 See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Sofia Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola, 
Health and Human Rights, in Perspectives in Health and Human Rights 3, 11 (Sofia 
Gruskin, Michael Grodin, George Annas & Stephen P. Marks eds. 2005); Norman Daniels, 
Brendan Saloner & Adriane H. Gelpi, Access, Cost, and Financing: Achieving an Ethical 
Health Reform, 28 Health Aff. w909, w909-16 (2009); Sofia Gruskin et al., Health and 
Human Rights 1, History, Principles and Practice of Health and Human Rights, 370 Lancet 
449, 449-55 (2007); Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Right to Health: What Does This 
Mean for Our National and World?, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1457, 1457-58 (2001). 
9 See, e.g., Deceptive Health Industry Practices: Are Consumers Getting What They Paid 
For?- Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. (Mar. 26, 
2009); Deceptive Health Industry Practices: Are Consumers Getting What They Paid For?- 
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I have argued elsewhere that such conflicting conceptions of health 
insurance can impede agreement on a unified structure of reform.10  Here, I 
argue that it is possible to reconcile these conceptions if we recognize health 
insurance as a separate species of insurance – distinct in function, and 
therefore content, from conventional indemnity insurance models.  Both 
regulation and industry practices already have moved health insurance a long 
way toward becoming an identifiably separate species by limiting some risk 
classification methods, but universal coverage requires purging or greatly 
circumscribing most tools of conventional insurance.  In addition, health 
plans no longer limit coverage to fortuitous losses, as does conventional 
indemnity insurance; by covering preventive care, they have added a service 
component to pay for regular care.  This is a familiar concept in social 
insurance systems, which are more concerned with financing care than 
spreading risk.  The role of insurance in such systems, especially in Western 
European countries, offers a model for integrating insurance plans and 
actuarial expertise into a financing mechanism for universal access to care.11   
Thus, health insurance can be, and to a large extent already is, a separate 
species of insurance. Little conventional insurance remains in today’s health 
plans,12 and there is little reason to believe that conventional insurance is 
necessary to provide access to health care. 13  However, even our hybrid species 
of health insurance is not likely to be universally affordable without ensuring 
participation by virtually all Americans.14  
                                                                                                                      
Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. (Mar. 31, 
2009); see also Coverage Denied: How the Current Health Insurance System Leaves Millions 
Behind, http://www.healthreform.gov/reports/denied_coverage/index.html.  For a different 
perspective on assumptions about reform, see David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health 
Insurance and Universal Coverage: Four Things People Know That Aren’t So, 9 Yale J. 
Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 435, 435-52 (2009). 
10 Mariner, supra note 1, at 200. 
11 This will also require modifying some insurance law doctrines to accommodate the 
hybrid nature of health insurance, a topic that deserves more extensive discussion, but is 
beyond the scope of this article.  See Thomas Morawetz, Insurance: How It Matters as 
Psychological Fact and Political Metaphor, 6 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1, 8 (1999) (“The line between 
insurance as a commodity, as an option, and insurance as a compulsory part of government 
regulation is always a moving target.”). 
12 Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health 
Benefits 2008 Annual Survey, 1, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf [hereinafter 
“Employer Health Benefits 2008 Annual Survey”].  
13 Congress could achieve universal coverage without the use of private sector insurance 
by expanding Medicare coverage to all or creating new, supplementary programs funded from 
tax revenues, as some scholars, policy analysts, and organizations have recommended. See, 
e.g., Julius B. Richmond & Rashi Fein, The Health Care Mess: How We Got Into It 
and What It Will Take to Get Out 243 (2005); John Nichols, Three Words Mr. President: 
“Medicare for All,” The Nation, Sept. 8, 2009, 
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat/469901/three_words_mr_president_medicare_for
_all (Sept. 8, 2009, 10:07 EST).  Political, as well as scholarly, opposition has precluded such 
an approach. Jacob S. Hacker, Putting Politics First:  Health System Reform Can Be Successful 
This Time If Policymakers Learn the Lessons From the Past, 27 Health Aff. 718, 721 (2008). 
See, e.g., David Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles (2006); Alan B. Miller, Opinion, 
Medicare for All Isn’t the Answer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A15; Peter Ferrara, Medicare 
for All Is a Killer, American Spectator, May 27, 2009, 
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/05/27/medicare-for-all-is-a-killer.  
14 See the 2010 Act, §1501 (adding §5000A to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), as 
amended by the 2010 Act, § 10106, and by the Reconciliation Act, §1002. At least fourteen 
states have filed challenges to the 2010 Act, claiming that it violates Congress’s power under 
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II.  CONVENTIONAL INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATIONS ARE 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH EXPANDED ACCESS 
A key goal of health reform is to give everyone access to health care. 
Health insurance is simply a means to that larger end: appropriate, affordable 
health care regardless of employment, residence, health status, age or other 
factors that currently inhibit access.  To use insurance to pay for care, 
insurance must be available to everyone. Thus, as reform proposals 
recommended, the 2010 Act requires plans to pay for health care in ways that 
necessarily limit the scope of conventional insurance techniques.  President 
Obama and members of Congress stressed that reform legislation should 
prohibit insurers from classifying people according to their risks in order to 
refuse coverage or greatly increase insurance premiums.15  The 2010 Act,16 as 
well as the Affordable Health Care for America Act,17 which the House of 
Representatives passed on November 7, 2009, and virtually all the reform 
bills seriously considered by Congressional Committees, prohibit insurers18 
from refusing to cover preexisting medical conditions,19 refusing people 
                                                                                                                      
the Commerce Clause, the power to tax and spend, the Tenth Amendment or federalism 
generally.  See Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 14 States Sue to Block Healthcare Reform 
Law, The Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 23, 2010, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0323/Attorneys-general-in-14-states-sue-to-
block-healthcare-reform-law.  The constitutional authority for a federal requirement that all 
individuals have coverage is beyond the scope of this article.  For the basic arguments for and 
against the propositions that that an individual mandate is within Congress’s Commerce 
Power and that fees levied on individuals without coverage are not direct taxes, see David B. 
Rivkin, Jr. et al., Debate, A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 
158 U. PA. L. Rev. PENNumbra 93 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf.  If challenges to the individual 
mandate succeed, Congress could achieve the same result without raising constitutional 
questions by increasing the income tax, Medicare tax, or Social Security tax, or imposing a new 
tax on all taxpayers, accompanied by a tax credit or deduction for those who have public or 
private coverage.  See the 2010 Act, § 1401 (adding § 36B to the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986), as amended by the 2010 Act, § 10105, and by the Reconciliation Act, §1001. 
15 Remarks by the President in Discussion on Insurance Reform at Bipartisan Meeting on 
Health Care Reform, Feb. 25, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-discussion-insurance-reform-bipartisan-meeting-health-care-
reform; Michael D. Shear & Debbi Wilgoren, As House and Senate Negotiate, Obama Fine-
Tunes His Pitch, Wash. Post, July 29, 2009, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/07/29/obama_to_offer_eight-
point_arg.html?hpid=topnews; see also Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 
2701 (1st Sess. 2009); America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 2204 (1st 
Sess. 2009); America’s Affordable Health Choices Act, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 113 (1st Sess. 
2009).  
16 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 3, originally H.R. 3590, 111th 
Cong. (as passed by Senate Dec. 24, 2009). 
17 Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (as passed by House 
Nov. 7, 2009). 
18 The prohibitions and requirements of the 2010 Act apply to private insurance plans in 
the individual and group market, including qualified plans offered in new health insurance 
exchanges, the 2010 Act, Title I, Subtitle D, and not to grandfathered employer-sponsored 
plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§1001 et seq, 
although certain provisions will apply to new employer-sponsored plans. 
19 The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2704, 42 U.S.C. 
§§300gg et seq.); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 211 (2009); S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009) (to 
amend Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2705); S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1001 (2009) 
(same); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 111 (2009). 
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coverage because of their medical history,20 dropping coverage after illness 
occurs,21 discriminating on the basis of health status,22 discriminating in 
benefits on the basis of age or disability,23 charging much higher premiums on 
the basis of age,24 providing less coverage for mental health and substance 
abuse disorder benefits than for medical conditions,25 capping the dollar 
amount of coverage,26 and charging high out-of-pocket expenses.27  The public 
also appears to support regulating health insurance coverage in this manner.28  
These prohibitions remove tools of risk classification that insurers have 
regarded as essential to permit underwriting in conventional insurance, if not 
inherent in the concept of insurance itself.29  Conventional indemnity 
insurance in an unregulated, competitive market relies on risk classification 
(by definition, a discriminatory process) to exclude bad risks and to 
underwrite or price those accepted according to their risk profiles.30  Familiar 
examples include homeowners insurance and life insurance.  To achieve 
universal (or nearly so) access to health care, therefore, reform legislation 
must prune and pad health plans so that they no longer look or function like 
conventional indemnity insurance policies.  Medical underwriting and 
preexisting condition exclusions must be suppressed like bad genes, while 
guaranteed issue and preventive measures are grafted on.   
                                                 
20 The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, §§ 2702, 2703 to 
guarantee issue and renewal, respectively); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 212 (2009); S. 1679, 111th 
Cong. § 101 (2009); S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1001 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 122 (2009). 
21 The 2010 Act, § 1001 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2712 to prohibit 
rescission); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 103 (2009); S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); H.R. 
3200, 111th Cong. § 112 (2009). 
22 The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act § 2705); H.R. 3962, 
111th Cong. § 211 (2009).  
23 The 2010 Act, § 1302(b)(4)(B) (2010); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 213, 214 (2009); S. 
1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1001 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 
113 (2009). 
24 The 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii) to 
limit premium rate variation based on age to 3:1); S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); S. 1796, 
111th Cong. § 1001 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 114 (2009); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 214 
(2009). 
25 2010 Act, § 1311(j) (2010); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 214 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th 
Cong. § 114 (2009). 
26 The 2010 Act, § 1001 (2010) (no lifetime or annual limits on dollar value of benefits); 
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 106, 109 (2009); S. 1697, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009); H.R. 3200, 
111th Cong. § 122(a)(3) (2009). 
27 The 2010 Act, §§ 1201, 1302(c); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 222(c) (2009); S. 1796, 111th 
Cong. § 1201 (2009); H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 122(c) (2009). 
28 Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, The Public’s 
Health Care Agenda for the New President and Congress 10 (Jan. 2009), 
http://kff.org/kaiserpolls/7853.cfm.  A recent poll of public opinions of the 2009 House and 
Senate Bills find that 63% of those surveyed favor provisions that prohibit insurers from 
denying coverage on the basis of health conditions.  Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser 
Health Tracking Poll: Public Opinion on Health Care Issues 5 (Jan. 2010), 
http://kff.org/kaiserpolls/8042.cfm.  
29 Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 Conn. Ins. L.J. 371, 377 (2003). 
30 Emmett J. Vaughan & Therese M. Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and 
Insurance 169-71 (10th ed. 2008); Harry A. Woodman, Principles of Risk Selection and 
Classification, in Medical Selection of Life Risks 25, 35 (R.D.C. Brackenridge & W. John 
Elder eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
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What remains of conventional insurance is risk rating – setting premiums 
according to risk profiles, analogous to charging loan interest rates according 
to credit-worthiness.  Neither the Act nor the reform proposals that preceded 
it restrict premiums beyond imposing rate bands for plans to be offered on 
exchanges, limiting the degree to which the premium for an insurer’s highest 
priced product may exceed the premium for its lowest priced product for a 
defined population.31  Thus, it will still be necessary to estimate a population’s 
total need for medical services in order to calculate premium rates that can 
cover the cost of providing benefits, as well as administrative costs, profit and 
taxes.32  However, to make premiums affordable to all, subsidies will be 
needed for low-income people with higher health risks.33  Moreover, if health 
plans must accept anyone who applies, then plans (public or private) with 
high risk populations will need subsidies or access to reinsurance if premiums 
are to remain competitive across the market,34 possibly financed by taxes on 
individuals or health plans with healthy populations.35  Such redistributional 
measures are necessary to achieve affordable premiums, but they distance 
premium rates from individual and even group risk.  Indeed, the calculations 
may differ little from those needed for financing many non-insurance services. 
The more that risk rating is diluted with redistributional funding, the more 
health plans look like vehicles to finance health care. 
III. CONVENTIONAL INDEMNITY HEALTH INSURANCE IS 
DISAPPEARING 
The health insurance industry in the United States is already far down the 
path toward becoming primarily a health care payer, and only secondarily an 
insurer of health risks.  Federal and state laws have circumscribed insurers’ 
freedom to use risk classification by mandating coverage of specific benefits 
and prohibiting the exclusion of some risks or charging higher premiums for 
others.36  For example, federal and many state laws prohibit discriminating 
against or excluding anyone from health coverage on the basis of a health 
factor, 37 experiencing domestic violence, 38 or genetic testing.39  Some states 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., the 2010 Act, § 1201 (2010) (adding Public Health Service Act, § 2701 to allow 
premium rate variations based on individual or family coverage, rating area, age, and tobacco 
use); H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 213 (2009); H.R. 3590, 11th Cong. § 1201 (2009).  Both bills 
also limit cost sharing. Supra note 28. 
32 National health spending was $2.3 trillion in 2008, or $7,681 per person, and 16.2% of 
GDP.  See Micah Hartman et al., Health Spending Growth At A Historic Low in 2008, 29 
Health Aff. 147, 147 (2010). 
33 Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. Econ. Lit. 571, 
572, 587 (Sept. 2008).  The 2010 Act provides for tax credits and subsidies.   
34  Elliot K. Wicks, Restructuring Health Insurance Markets, National 
Academy of Social Insurance 1, 13-14 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.nasi.org/research/2009/restructuring-health-insurance-markets.  
35 Victor R. Fuchs, The Proposed Government Health Insurance Company – No Substitute 
for Real Reform, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 2273, 2275 (2009); Jacob S. Hacker, Health Care 
2009 – The Why and How of “Public-Plan Choice,” 360 New Eng. J. Med. 2269, 2269 (2009); 
Mark Hall, The Structure and Enforcement of Health Insurance Rating Reforms, 37 INQUIRY 
367, 377-78 (2001). 
36 National Conference of State Legislatures, Health Reform: State Examples (Mar. 22, 
2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17691.  
37 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (West 2008). 
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also prohibit or limit risk rating on the basis of gender, at least in group 
policies.  However, San Francisco’s Attorney General has sued the insurance 
commissioner for permitting health insurers to use gender rating in individual 
insurance policies.40  If, as reported, women use more medical services than 
men,41 then it would be actuarially fair to charge women higher premiums 
than men, as many states permit.42  This actuarial fairness argument is 
regularly invoked to justify higher premiums for the elderly, smokers and 
others with above average health risks.43  If the goal of a reformed health 
system is to treat everyone the same, however, then actuarial fairness is 
irrelevant. 
Insurance companies already function solely as payment intermediaries 
rather than conventional insurers for tens of millions of Americans in 
employee group health plans.  In 2008, 55% of employees with health 
insurance participated in employer-sponsored plans that are fully or partially 
self-insured (up from 49% in 2000).44  Insurance companies do not issue 
insurance policies to such plans.  The employer bears the financial risk of loss 
(hence the term “self-insured”), and typically hires an insurance company or 
other third-party-administrator to administer the plan (collect contributions 
and pay claims) for a fee.   
Insurance companies also perform administrative services for government 
benefit programs, Medicare in particular.45  Medicare is not a conventional 
insurance system, despite its title, Health Insurance for the Aged and 
Disabled.46  Rather, it is a statutory entitlement program, with benefits, 
premiums and provider payments authorized by statute and specified by 
regulations.  Although Medicare must calculate needed funds based on risk, it 
does not engage in underwriting practices, such as excluding high risks. 
Rather, it automatically covers retirees over 65 years of age, as well as disabled 
                                                                                                                      
38 Id.  See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A 
Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 355, 355-56 (1997). 
39 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (West 2008). 
40 Nathan Olivarez-Giles, California Health Insurers Discriminate Against Women, 
Lawsuit Contends, L.A. Times, Jan. 28. 2009, at C1. 
41 Cameron A. Mustard et al., Sex Differences in the Use of Health Care Services, 338 New 
Eng. J. Med. 1678, 1678 (1998); Paul D. Cleary et al., Sex Differences in Medical Care 
Utilization: An Empirical Investigation, 23 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 106, 106 (1982). 
42 Jane Slater, Colorado Women Pay More for Insurance Than Men, 
TheDenverChannel, Oct. 19, 2009, 
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/health/21343272/detail.html; Barbara Barrett, N.C. Lets 
Insurers Charge Women More, McClatchy, Oct. 12, 2009, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/story/76996.html.  
43 See Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Insurance, 18 J. Health, Pol. Pol’y & 
L. 287, 287-88 (1993). 
44 Employer Health Benefits 2008 Annual Survey, supra note 12, at 154-55. 
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2006).   
46 Theodore Marmor, et al., America's Misunderstood Welfare State: 
Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities 178-79 (1990).  However, Medicare beneficiaries 
may pay a premium for Part B (physician services), and purchase a Medicare Advantage health 
plan from a private insurer under Part C in lieu of traditional Medicare Parts A and B 
coverage, and also purchase a prescription drug coverage plan from a private insurer under 
Part D.  
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individuals, in a national pool of nearly 45 million Americans.47  The federal 
government also pays directly for care for 7.8 million veterans enrolled in the 
Veteran Affairs health care system and a large fraction of the 9 million 
military personnel, dependents and retirees for whom the Department of 
Defense is responsible.48  State-based Medicaid and SCHIP programs, which 
together cover more than 61 million people,49 do enroll some beneficiaries in 
private health plans, but pay providers directly for most care.  These 
government benefit programs pay for health care for about 40% of 
Americans.50  They also account for more than half of total health care 
expenditures.51 
These examples indicate that a growing percentage of the health 
insurance business lies not in risk-bearing indemnity insurance, but in 
providing administrative services for government benefit programs and 
private self-funded plans.  Although the profit margin for administrative 
service contracts may be lower than for risk-bearing insurance policies, the 
former may prove to be a more relevant and reliable business model for the 
health insurance industry’s future. 
IV. PAYING FOR CARE v. SPREADING RISK 
Health insurers have moved away from conventional indemnity insurance 
practices, even in their own health plans.52  Fewer than eleven million 
Americans bought individual health insurance policies in 2006,53 down from 
16 million in 1999.54  Most employees and their dependents with health 
insurance are in employer-sponsored plans, most with some form of managed 
                                                 
47 Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, Kaiser Family Foundation State 
Health Care Facts (2009), 
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48 Inst. of Med., Combating Tobacco Use in Military and Veteran Populations 34 
(2009). 
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Outlook on Reauthorization from the Program’s Directors 5 (2007), available at 
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7642.pdf. 
50 Marmor, supra note 46, at 179. 
51 Thomas M. Selden & Merrile Sing, The Distribution of Public Spending for Health Care 
in the United States, 2002, Health Aff. w349, w353, w357 (2008) (public spending on 
health care for the non-institutionalized civilian population averaged 56% of total spending; 
adding institutionalized civilians raises public spending to more than 64% of the total). 
52 See Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is 




53 Press Release, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Nearly 11 Million 
Americans Have Individual Health Insurance Policies, But Some Only for a Short Time, (Jan. 
7, 2009).  
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care.  About 8% of employees work for employers that offer conventional 
indemnity insurance.55  Although the Department of Labor classified 76% of 
the workers in private industry with health benefits as covered by “indemnity” 
insurance in 2005, it found only 7% had traditional indemnity insurance 
policies that allow choice of provider without payment restrictions.56  The rest 
were in plans organized as PPOs [Preferred Provider Organizations] and 
HDHP/HSAs [High deductible health plans/health savings accounts], which 
are gaining market share, while an additional 24% were in prepaid plans like 
HMOs, which are declining.  More recent surveys suggest that only 2% of all 
workers are enrolled in conventional indemnity plans.57 
The world of health benefits is making conventional insurance models 
obsolete.  Instead of insurance policies, we have health plans, which perform 
two distinct financial functions: risk spreading for unanticipated health 
problems; and paying for routine or regular health services.  The risk 
spreading function of health insurance remains for unpredicted medical 
problems.  Yet, the financial need for risk spreading is largely confined to 
illnesses and injuries that are expensive to diagnose or treat.  In contrast, the 
payment function operates like a service contract to pay for routine health 
care visits, such as regularly scheduled physical examinations and dental 
cleanings.58  The addition of the service contract function to insurance policies 
is a welcome, but striking departure from insurance jurisprudence, which has 
prized the risk spreading function of insurance above all other possible 
purposes.59  
Two premises underlie risk spreading.  First, risks should be predictable 
for a population; that is, the probability of a harm (loss) occurring in a 
population should be ascertainable.  Second, risks should be unpredictable for 
an individual; that is, whether it will occur to a particular individual should be 
uncertain.60  Uncertainty for the individual is embedded in the fortuity 
principle, the assumption that insurance is designed for losses that a specific 
individual cannot expect to incur (beyond the general possibility for all others 
similarly situated).61  Although actuaries are skilled at estimating the 
percentage of a given population that is likely to experience glaucoma, for 
example, in any given year, the risk of glaucoma for a particular individual is 
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considered insurable only if the individual has no specific knowledge that s/he 
has or will soon have the disease.  Decades of court decisions confirm that 
policyholders who know they are about to suffer a loss or who bring one about 
are not entitled to the benefits of insurance.62  The known loss doctrine 
precludes coverage of a loss that has already occurred or one that the 
policyholder reasonably expected to occur.63  The federal Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit described the doctrine as inherent in the concept of 
insurance: “[t]he known loss doctrine seeks to prevent the concept of an 
insurable risk from becoming a mere fiction when the insured knows there is 
a substantial probability that it has suffered or will suffer a loss covered by the 
policy.”64  As Thomas Morawetz notes, “in a world that is perfectly ordered, 
controlled, and determined, insurance has no meaning.”65   
Yet, today’s health plans do provide benefits for predictable expenses. 
Many plans pay for preventive services, such as immunizations, 
mammograms, cholesterol screening, and annual physical examinations, and 
the 2010 Act requires coverage of certain preventive services.66  In the 
conventional sense of insurance, these are not insurable risks, because they 
are expected events, controlled and scheduled by the patient.67  For sound 
reasons of public policy, however, states have required health insurers to pay 
for many such services as mandated benefits, and many insurers have done so 
voluntarily in response to consumer demand.   
It has become nearly impossible for insurers to spread risk solely by 
increasing premiums to cover rising health care costs, which now exceed 2 
trillion dollars.68  They need to control their expenditures, but their options 
are limited.69  Two – reducing payments to providers and reducing 
administrative costs and profit margins – do not appeal to those who would 
lose income.70  The remaining options, which are traditional insurance tools, 
                                                 
62 M. Elizabeth Medaglia et al., The Status of Certain Nonfortuity Defenses in Casualty 
Insurance Coverage, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. 943, 943 (1994) (finding that the principle that 
insurance covers only fortuitous losses is universally recognized). 
63 See, e.g., Stonehenge Engineering Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 201 F.3d 296, 
301-02 (4th Cir. 2000); U.S. Liability Ins. Co. v. Selman, 70 F.3d 684, 690-91 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (1992); 7 Lee R. Russ 
& Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance §§ 102.8-102.9 (3d ed. 2009). 
64 Stonehenge Engineering Corp., 201 F.3d at 301-02.  See also U.S. Liability Ins. Co., 70 
F.3d at 690 (“[T]he presence of risk runs to the very essence of an insurance contract.  Where 
there is no risk of loss – as where a loss has already occurred before a policy takes effect – 
insurance ceases to serve its socially useful function of risk-spreading.”). 
65 Morawetz, supra note 11, at 4. 
66 The 2010 Act, §§ 1001 (adding § 2713 to the Public Health Service Act), 1302(b)(1)(I), 
1301(b)(1)(J).  Dental and eye care are typically covered by separate policies from general 
health insurance, but do cover preventive examinations. 
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70 The 2010 Act and earlier federal reform proposals have been criticized for failing to 
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run contrary to the goals of reform: excluding people with higher risks of 
illness from coverage or charging them actuarially fair, but very high, possibly 
unaffordable premiums; excluding coverage of preexisting or expensive 
conditions or treatments; and capping coverage amounts.   
Instead of using conventional insurance techniques, therefore, insurers 
must try to manage their costs by either limiting or discouraging the use of 
unnecessary or overly expensive covered services.  Pre-authorization 
requirements for specialty care and specific treatments and caps on the 
number of covered treatments or visits are examples of limiting techniques. 
Discouragement techniques include cost sharing: co-insurance, deductibles, 
and co-payments.  These management techniques are intended to keep 
covered losses within bounds by influencing the behavior of people enrolled in 
a health plan, but they are admittedly blunt tools.71 
Management techniques are sometimes viewed as ways to reduce moral 
hazard – the possibility that once insured, a person has less incentive to 
prevent a loss (or avoid health care services).72  But, moral hazard is less likely 
to affect a person’s behavior with respect to health care than it can with 
respect to other types of insurance, like fire or automobile insurance, because 
the policyholder suffers the loss physically as well as financially.  Instead, 
moral hazard is more likely to affect policyholder decisions about elective and 
preventive services, where the patient has more control and can behave more 
like a consumer than a patient.73  In other words, moral hazard arises more 
naturally on the service-contract side of a health plan than on the risk-
spreading indemnity side.  
Paradoxically, while health plans manage risk on the risk-spreading side 
of the policy by limiting the use of services, they manage risk on the service-
contract side of the policy by encouraging the use of services.  Patients are 
supposed to avoid using some services, like MRIs, while consumers are 
encouraged to use others, like immunizations, regularly.  If insurers 
responded to moral hazard in conventional ways, they would discourage 
policyholders from voluntarily using too many elective services.  Moreover, as 
Tom Baker makes clear, insurers face their own moral hazard,74 since they 
have a financial incentive to retain as much of the premiums as possible by 
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paying fewer benefits.75  Here again, health plans diverge from the 
conventional model of insurance. 
Before the 2010 Act endorsed coverage of prevention, health plans began 
to cover an increasing number of preventive and disease management 
services.76  The federal government encouraged group health plans to adopt 
this service coverage by exempting most “wellness programs” from HIPAA’s 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of a health factor.77  Although 
these programs are often described as reducing the need for more expensive 
medical care in the future,78 the evidence on cost saving is mixed.79  Too few 
preventive services save money in the long run.80  The best reason for 
encouraging prevention programs is to improve people’s health, not to reduce 
covered losses.81  
It makes sense to pay for prevention if one thinks of the risk of disease in 
terms of health status instead of financial loss.82  Health plans that pay for 
preventive services are simply financing disease prevention and health 
promotion.  Thus, coverage of preventive services has moved health plan 
operations further from conventional insurance and closer to functioning as 
health care payment plans.  Furthermore, to the extent that these efforts 
succeed, Medicare, not insurance, may ultimately pay for the care that is 
needed at the end of longer, healthier lives.83  
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 V. USING ACTUARIAL EXPERTISE WITHOUT UNDERWRITING 
There is ample historical precedent for using the expertise of actuaries 
and insurance claims administrators in contexts beyond conventional 
commercial indemnity insurance.  Insurance policies have been viewed as 
devices for thrift, 84 self-help,85 mutual aid,86 investment,87 gambling,88 and 
even defying the will of God,89 in the United States and elsewhere.  
The perspective of William Beveridge, the founder of Britain’s national 
health insurance system, has special resonance for American health reform.90 
Beveridge conceived of social insurance as a thrift mechanism, and the 
government needed this thrift to reduce the number of people receiving “poor 
relief.”91  Beveridge distinguished between “compulsory thrift” to pay for 
necessities and “voluntary thrift” for everything else.92  Since necessities must 
be available to everyone, he argued, the state is a proper party to organize 
their provision.93  To cover everyone, of course, contributions had to be 
compulsory, which only the state can require.  Social insurance financed by 
compulsory fees provides protection against financial risks in the same way 
that that police departments financed by taxes provide protection against 
property damage and bodily injury.94  However, people were free to purchase 
voluntary indemnity insurance for non-necessities in the private market.  
Many Western European countries adopted “social insurance” schemes for 
health care before commercial insurers had secured much of a market in 
private policies.95  Governments could incorporate insurers into the new 
national health system to act as financial facilitators or administrators of a 
public program, rather than risk-bearing entrepreneurial vendors of 
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commercial policies.96  Health insurance entities, whether private or public, 
developed within a more or less carefully regulated sphere to serve a public 
function.97  This approach, which varies from country to country,98 takes 
advantage of insurers’ actuarial expertise, while tailoring the companies’ 
business operations to the national program’s goals.  Although companies are 
profitable, their national health program activities are more ministerial than 
entrepreneurial.99  
In contrast, health insurance in the United States grew up largely 
independently in the private sector and has deep roots in the entrepreneurial 
ethos of private enterprise.100  Blue Cross and Blue Shield began with an 
indemnity insurance model (yet avoiding regulation as an insurer),101 while 
employer-based groups like Kaiser Permanente created prepaid service 
models.102  In the absence of a national health program, most private health 
plans grew to mimic conventional lines of commercial indemnity insurance. 
This may explain some industry resistance to reforms that look more like 
social insurance.  Yet, as more recent history shows, private health insurance 
companies do much more than sell conventional indemnity insurance.103 
Private insurers now administer government benefits, as well as self-insured 
employee group health plans, resembling Western European practice. Many of 
the health benefit programs that we call insurance today are insurance in 
name only.  
All health care programs, including private plans and social insurance 
schemes, must determine what kind of care should be available to all: what to 
pay for; how to price it; what sources of revenue to use; what limits to put on 
which services; and how to encourage the most appropriate care.104  These 
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decisions depend on predictions of the population’s medical needs and the 
providers and services needed.  Insurance companies with expertise in 
estimating needs and costs, as well as administering payments, can play a role 
in this process, whether or not they act as risk-bearing gatekeepers. 
It must be recognized that private insurers cannot be expected to accept 
everyone who applies for coverage regardless of health status, provide 
comprehensive care including preventive services, and also keep premiums 
relatively affordable unless everyone is in the aggregate insurance pool. 
Without universal participation, healthy people would rationally wait to 
purchase insurance until they needed it, as adverse selection predicts, and 
premiums prices would rise to meet the costs of caring for those who need 
care.  After COBRA and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 required insurers to provide post-employment coverage to 
qualified employees,105 the General Accountability Office found that insurers 
“discouraged individuals from applying for coverage or charged them rates 
140 to 600 percent of the standard premium.”106  Thus, the goal of keeping 
premiums affordable depends on requiring participation by virtually everyone 
in the population or allowing government to convert the system into one of 
complete or partial social insurance.  If the American system seeks to enable 
private insurers to provide coverage, it must require participation by all those 
who do not now have health benefits in some form.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
A majority of the Congress and the public support health care payment 
plans that look almost nothing like conventional indemnity insurance: health 
plans that accept all people regardless of health status, cover both existing and 
future medical conditions, and pay for preventive as well as acute care 
services.107  In reality, these plans are a very different species of insurance, one 
that uniquely combines elements of risk spreading insurance and service 
payment commitments.  Legislators who believe that everyone should have 
insurance cannot achieve universal coverage without eliminating most 
conventional insurance practices and transforming the very meaning and 
function of health insurance.  A more transparent approach to reform would 
make explicit that health plans constitute a valuable, separate species of 
insurance designed primarily to finance socially beneficial health services by 
spreading the cost of care.  
Recognizing health insurance as a separate species of insurance has 
several advantages.  It more accurately reflects how we use health plans today 
– as vehicles to pay for care – and mutes opposition to reform that is based 
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solely on the assumption that only conventional indemnity insurance is real 
insurance.  In addition, it embraces coverage of both acute and preventive 
care, avoiding disputes over what counts as an insurable risk, and focuses on 
calculating costs without imposing controversial underwriting practices.  
Most important, it should allow us to proceed with the real work of designing 
a reasonable benefit package.  Policy makers can think more clearly about 
what care should be available to all and how to pay for it. 
 To be sure, treating health insurance as a distinct species of insurance 
will require adjusting some traditional statutory and legal doctrines that 
underpin insurability, coverage, and contract interpretation.108  Adapting legal 
principles to innovative relationships is a familiar challenge to law, however, 
not a significant obstacle.  Health insurance plans can occupy a conceptual 
space between conventional insurance and consumer transactions, which 
serves its real role as financing health care. 
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